1-Introduction
The Commonwealth of independent States (hereinafter the CIS, in Russian as Sodruzhestvo Nezavisimykh Gosudarstv) is a free association of sovereign states which vvas formed vvith an agreement in 8 December 1991.
1 This organisation comprises Russia and 11 other republics that vvere formerly part of the Soviet Union. On 8 December 1991 the elected leaders of Russia, Ukraine and Belarus signed an agreement forming a nevv association to replace the crumbling Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (U.S.S.R.). The three Slavic republics vvere subsequently joined by the Central Asian republics of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Türkmenistan, Uzbekistan, by the Transcaucasian republics of Azerbaijan, Armenia and Georgia, and by Moldavia, vvhile the remaining former Soviet republics of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia declined to join the nevv organisation. The Commonvvealth officially came into being on 21 December 1991, and its administrative centre is novv situated in Minsk, Belarus. The year 2001 has a commemorative significance vvith regard to discussing the CIS in that 2001 marks the tenth anniversary of the offıcial inauguration of the nevv organisation. Since then, suffıcient time has elapsed to permit us to dravv certain conclusions concerning the past, present and future of the CIS. In so doing, unlike earlier vvriters I am rather fortunate as I have had the chance to east light on the CIS from the vantage points of a decade-lasting experience. 3 In addition, May 2001 heralded the birth of a nevv community vvithin the CIS mould: The Eurasian 
Economic Community (EEC).
To what degree the "EEC II", so to speak, will be akin to its predecessor is hinged on how better the CIS integration is perceived. It is therefore very pertinent and timely to assess the past and the mistakes of the CIS to portend if there is any chance of its resuscitation.
To this end, the aim of this study is threefold: First, to introduce the reader the basic structure of the CIS. Secondly, to assess the legal status of the CIS and to answer to what extent the CIS has acquired a firm basis in international law and finally to draw lessons from the institutional mistakes made in the advancement a nevv regional organisation. Portraying this is important inasmuch as the failure of this integration model might prevent similar mistakes from being repeated in the sub-regional integration models.
Even though this paper aims to assess vvhether the CIS is an example of successful integration and could be a model for the future, in the interim hovvever, a common statement, seen in many documents touching on the political, economic, military and legal aspects of the CIS, is frequently encountered. 4 According to vvhich, the CIS, ever since its inception, failed to be a successful model of integration. The future of the CIS appears to be bleak. One ventures to say that the CIS is a sick-man vvaiting for his end. Therefore, this paper will look at legal weaknesses inherent in the CIS ever since its advent so that similar symptoms be ameliorated in other organisations facing the same problems.
Seen in this way, the CIS is an excellent example to study how such an organisation could be established so weak as to crumble into pieces vvithin a couple of years. 5 Admittedly, the leaders, remnants of the former USSR, with no liberal and democratic pedigree could not do better than this. Or rather, let us put the problem euphemistically: The reason why the CIS has failed to integrate the Soviet successor states in any meaningful sense was that it is an example of, "organisational cloning", or in other words an institutional "dolly". In the eyes of Russians, after the collapse of the USSR, the most rational thing was to extract the DNA, that is to say, the spirit of the old Empire, namely the Russian hegemony, and transplant in vitro into the celi of the CIS. In the process of in vitro fertilisation, the genetic code of the European Union were used. Ali the same, the outcome was the failure of Russian social engineers. The transplantation was doomed to fail. After ali, what was conjured up was not a rejuvenated Russian bear, but only a teddy bear.
Nevertheless, the failure of the CIS encapsulates important lessons in its short span of life. Studying över them will garner many lessons for the future. 6 Hovvever, vvithin the ambit of this paper, only three façades of the problem vvill be relayed. CIS has never been crystal clear. This defıciency has devoid the CIS of its legal personality. (2) Decision-making system: The CIS established so weak a decision-making system that it is no wonder that the targets of the CIS as laid down in constitutive instruments have never been met. (3) Lack of normative supranationality: In other words, the CIS founders appears to have ignored or, at least, underscored the fact that a successful integration such as the European one could only be an outcome of an intricate amalgamation of politics, economics and law. 7 Although the decision to set up the CIS was a political act ovenvhelmingly motivated by economic and security reasons, but unlike the European integration, the law was not used as the agent of cohesion. Therefore, even though the Slavic and Central Asian integration process has expanded remarkably ever since 1991, as the legal instruments were not used effectively, the CIS is ali but about to collapse. Therefore, in the third section of the paper, a comparison will be made with the European integration model to verify this axiom.
2-Brief Overvievv of the Organisation: The CIS with Hindsight
On 8 December 1991 in Minsk the leaders of the three Slav Republics of the Soviet Union hastily penned and signed both the Declaration by the Heads of State of the Republic of Belarus, the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic and Ukraine, and the Agreement Establishing the Commonwealth of Independent States. The Alma-Ata summit of 21 December 1991, was another crucial leap in the speedy transition from the USSR to the CIS. The leaders of eleven Member States of the Soviet Union, apart from Georgia, confirmed and developed the Minsk arrangements. Ali States signed and ratified the Protocol to the Agreement Establishing the CIS, which at the same time terminated the USSR. As far as Article 1 of the 1993 Charter of the Commonwealth of independent States, the CIS is based on principles of sovereign equality of ali its members which are independent subjects of international law having equal rights. The CIS Charter lays down a multi-purpose regional organisation vvith rather close cooperation in terms of political, military, economic, social and cultural spheres. The Commonvvealth vvas devised to serve for the further development and strengthening of the relationships of friendship, good neighbourhood, inter-ethnic harmony, trust, mutual understanding and mutually advantageous cooperation among the member states. As to the organs of the CIS; there are some 30 inter-state intergovernmental organs. The most important of vvhich are the follovving:
(1) The Charter-based Organs: The supreme body of the Commonvvealth is the Council of Heads of State (CHS) vvhich discusses and solves any principle questions of the Commonvvealth connected vvith the common interests of the participant states (Art. 21). The Council of Heads of Government (CHG) coordinates cooperation of the executive authorities of the participant states in economic, social and other spheres of their common interests (Art. 22). Decisions of the CHS and the CHG are adopted by consensus. This means that any member state may acknovvledge about its lack of interest in one or another question, the fact being not considered as an obstacle for adopting a decision.
The Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs is the main executive body ensuring cooperation in the fıeld of foreign policy activities of the participant states of the CIS on the matters of mutual interest, adopting decisions during the period betvveen the meetings of the CHS, the CHG and by their orders (Art. 27).
The Economic Court functions vvith the aim of ensuring the meeting of economic commitments in the framevvork of the CIS (Art. 32). its terms of reference include settlement of interstate economic controversy arising in meeting economic commitments envisaged by Agreements and decisions of the CHS and the CHG of the CIS. In 1996, Nazarbaev drafted another program, "integration 2000", but fell on deaf ears.
13 By 1996, a customs union among Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan had been formally declared, but agreements on forming a common tariff structure were only signed in January 1998. Nazarbaev's proposal to turn this "group of four" into a common, CIS-wide economic space along the lines of the European Union was rebuffed by both Yeltsin and Lukashenko.
14 In February 1999, by the decision of the Interstate Council of four countries (Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia), Tajikistan vvas recognized as participant of the customs union enjoying full rights. 15 Interaction of countries in the framevvork of the Commonvvealth is realised through its coordinating institutions. Having seen the rudimentary structure of the organisation in a deseriptive fashion, let us have a look at the problematic aspects of the integration. 
3-The CIS's Uncertain International Legal Status
The first problem to be dealt vvith is the international legal status of the CIS. If any traditional organisational model were to be applied, neither system would resemble this kind of entity that most politicians and jurists have in mind. The CIS is neither a state nor a süper state, 16 nor a quasi-state, or supranational organisation. Because, Article 1 of the CIS Charter says that " [t] h e Commonwealth shall not be a state, nor possess supranational powers". If it had been a state, it would have become the successor state to the USSR. 17 Needless to say, nor is there a Commonvvealth citizenship, no standing joint armed forces and no common currency.
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It goes vvithout saying, it is not a federal state either since the CIS Charter cannot be construed as a federal constitution. In fact, federalism could not have been uttered at the birth of the CIS vvhen the old satellite states had recently got rid of the shackles of the USSR. As a matter of fact, as shall be touched upon belovv, neither is it a confederation model in classical sense. One vvould admit that at best it is a sui generis structure vvhich cannot be compared easily vvith existing political entities. Belovv are the arguments verifying vvhy exact analogies vvith the existing state formations or interstate unions cannot be made.
Traditionally speaking, the CIS meets ali the fundamental formal criteria of an intergovernmental organization, vvhich are: (1) establishment on the basis of an international agreement in 16 It is not a state since it does not have a government, parliament, constitution and any enforcement mechanism to implement its decisions. CIS members agreed that Russia, Ukraine and Belarus vvould retain their memberships in the UN General Assembly. Russia assumed the Soviet seat on the UN Security Council. 19 (2) membership of sovereign states; (3) permanently functioning administrative structure; (4) at least an organ vvith a vvill of its ovvn, established under international lavv; (5) the objective of coordination of the member states' cooperation in particular fields. 20 Once agreed that it is an international organisation of some sort, the follovving questions should be asked: Does it have legal personality? Is it a regional organisation? Is it a confederation? If not, is it similar to the Commonvvealth (formerly the [British] Commonvvealth of Nations)? Or is it more akin to the International Organisation of La Francophonie? Or should it have been modelled on loose structures similar to the OSCE or the Council of Europe? To vvhat extent has it similarities to NATO? Or is it an economic integration similar to EU? These are the questions that need to be handled.
-The CIS has not been conferred on international personality
The fact that international organisations (IGOs) have been vested in international personality, albeit in a constraint sense, does not entail that ali international organisations do possess legal personality of some sort. Generally speaking, organisations set up by treaties are devolved upon limited legal personality vvith vvhich they can make treaties vvithin the ambit of their aims, or exercise their functions and fulfil their purposes. Treaties establishing international organisations often provide clauses vvhether it is conferred on legal personality. 21 As international organisations do 21 For example Article 104 of the UN Charter provides that "the organisation shall enjoy in the territory of each of its members such legal capacity as may be necessary for the exercise of its functions and the fulfilment of its purposes'. Article 43 of the Charter empovvers the UN to include certain types of treaty vvith member states". Article 210 of the Rome Treaty (after amendmcnt Art. 281) says that the EC shall have legal personality. So does it say for the European Central Bank Statute (Article 9), and the not possess personality ipso facto and ab initio, one should look at the attitudes of other states to elicit if the CIS is looked upon as a legal person. When heeded to the CIS Charter to find out vvhether or not the CIS has been vested in personality, one bumps into Article 1 of the 1993 Charter, vvhich denounces that the CIS is a state and possess supranational authority. The Charter does not fumish explicit provisions on the treaty-making competence of the Commonvvealth. This insinuates that the intention of Russia as vvell as those of 11 members states vvas to establish a lovv profile structure akin to OSCE. For example, Ukraine pursued a policy aimed at keeping the Commonvvealth a vveak confederation by rejecting attempts to set up permanent CIS coordinating structures and blocking efforts to build central CIS bureaucracy. 22 The Central Asia leaders, too, vvere only demanding that Moscovv recreate "an informal grouping" of former Soviet republics.
-The CIS is not a regional organisation
The term "regional organisation" has special meaning in the parlance of the United Nations. Geographically speaking, the CIS appears to be a regional organisation such as the EU or OSCE or NAFTA. As far as the UN Charter is concerned, articles enunciated in Chapter VIII (namely Article 52-54) regulate regional arrangements according to vvhich these organisations could make every effort to achieve pacific or peaceful settlement of regional disputes. The Security Council is entitled to utilise them for enforcement action. They are authorised enforcement action vvith the consent of the Security Council and the Council vvill be fully informed of activities undertaken for the maintenance of international peace and security In December 1993, the CIS Heads of Government instructed the Chairman of the CIS Council of Foreign Ministers to ask the United Nations to grant the CIS observer status in the General Assembly. A draft resolution was adopted on 24 March 1994 without a vote. The Resolution was agreed upon the argument that the CIS Charter of 22 January 1993 furnished the legal framework of the organisation and the CIS had a standing executive body and more than 30 primary and subsidiary bodies. It vvas also argued that apart from economic dimension, it had also foreign policy and human rights dimensions. Therefore, Russia argued that the CIS vvas a regional organisation vvithin the ambit of Chapter VIII of the UN Charter. 23 Hovvever, the Ukrainian Ambassador to the UN rejected that the CIS vvas a subject of international lavv and claimed that it vvas a merely special international, inter-regional formation. The Ukraine advanced the argument that the CIS's observer status could only represent the member states vvhich signed and ratifıed the Charter, vvhich Ukraine did not. Conferring upon observer status, as far as Ukraine is concerned, should not be read as entailing that the CIS is a regional arrangement vvithin the framevvork of Chapter VIII of the Charter. The EU presidency, Norvvay, Estonia and the US also noted that their support of the CIS as observer to the UN should not entail as support for authorisation by the Security Council of enforcement or other action by the CIS. 24 It should not be construed that the UNMOT (United Nations Missions of Observers in Tajikistan) cooperated closely vvith a peacekeeping force of the CIS in 1997 to help promote peace and reconciliation and assist in implementing the peace agreement vvith Tajik pro-Islamic traditionalists is an evidence of the UN's recognition of the CIS as a regional organisation. Similar cooperation took place in Georgia in 1996 as UNOMIG (United Nations Observers Mission in Georgia). The fıghting parties agreed to the deployment of a peacekeeping force of the CIS to monitor compliance vvith the peace agreement. In the meantime UNOMIG did the same thing in addition to observing the operation of the 23 26 When it comes to the CIS, could one attribute 'a modern version of confederation' to it?
Early comments on the CIS referred to it as "not a successor state to the former Soviet Union but a confederation of independent republics". 27 In the heydays of the integration, some commentators treated the CIS as an intergovernmental organisation with the elements of confederation. 28 For example, Danilenko says the CIS is a version of Russian federalisin in the form of a confederate model. 29 However, the CIS Charter declined to use the term "confederation" with regard to the Commonwealth's status, because of the fear that it was too prematüre to establish a Statelike formation. Nevertheless, the suggested institutional model of the CIS has parallels with a loose confederation in the sense that it is a purpose-oriented union of sovereign states with coordinating organs of its own. The institutional structure of the CIS in the Charter's version is more ramified than that of the classical confederations, but less centralised than the Senegambian Confederation.
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In addition to this, unlike confederations, the Commonvvealth does not hinge on a common foreign policy. For example, the Russian-Ukrainian dispute över the future of the Black Sea Fleet and definitions of "strategic forces" brought to surface ali the fragility of the Commonvvealth. 31 In the Black Sea Fleet example, it is seen that CIS decision-making system does not resemble confederal form, since Russia and Ukraine violated the CIS Agreement vvith the Black Sea Fleet Agreement inasmuch as tvvo of them did not take the vievvs of the rest of the CIS members in deciding to jointly control the Fleet and thereby by acting outside the proscribed CIS methods and by denying to hand över part of the Fleet to other states to develop their ovvn navies. 32 Therefore, one year after the conclusion of the CIS Charter, it vvas turned into a very loose document. By mid-1992, the idea of a "Eurasian confederation" lost a lot of its initial appeal in Russia as vvell as other states. This vvas galvanised by Russian attitude. Apart from clearly supporting the "confederationist" approach in some 28 
-The CIS is not identical to the Council of Europe, the OSCE or NATO
The original intention in December 1991 vvas to maintain a unifıed security structure in the post-Soviet region. 44 The result vvas a mixture of NATO and the OSCE. But a nevv NATO-type alliance system, proposed by Russia in Minsk and Alma-Ata in December 1991, vvas seen an attempt to recover the position of Russia's regional influence lost vvith the collapse of the USSR. 45 The fact that Russian troops are deployed in many of the former Soviet republics as "peace-keeping" forces under CIS commitments 46 should not convince one to equate the CIS vvith NATO. Even though the Alma-Ata agreements envisaged preservation of the "common military-strategic space", it vvas rejected by Ukraine, Azerbaijan and Moldova, vvhile Uzbekistan and Türkmenistan insisted on building their national armies before any military integration vvith other CIS states. In May 1992 Russia itself had to announce that it started its ovvn national army beyond the structures of the CIS Supreme Command.
policies, consulting and co-operating in the interests of their peoples and in the promotion of international understanding and vvorld peace. 42 As far as the goals of the CIS are concemed, it is to be seen that parallel activities with notable organisations such as the Council of Europe, NATO and the OSCE are there. However, the CIS's activities encompasses those of others. For example the Charter contains as diverse provisions as ensuring human rights and basic freedoms, cooperation in developing transport and communication systems, protection of health and environment, social and migration policy issues, combating organized erime, protection of external boundaries, ete.
Taken human rights example, the Council of Europe is famous for its human rights meehanism. The founders of the CIS appear to have impressed by its dazzling performance. Hovvever, vvhen one gazes at how human rights meehanism operates, one sees the difference. Weakness can be run into in the attempts to establish a new regional human rights system within the CIS on the basis of the Convention on Fundamental Rights and Freedoms. 47 Even though there is a machinery called Human Rights Commission whose task would be to monitor implementation of the provisions of the Convention, there exists no strong enforcement system. As its decisions are not legally binding, the Commission is likely to fail to protect human rights vvithin domestic legal systems.
As one could make out, the CIS vvas conceptualised as a consensus-based consultative forum. The 12 members have held alvvays radically divergent conceptions of the organisation's shape and purpose. While they have been alvvays sensitive to the protection of their newly-acquired sovereignty, perceptions of the degree to vvhich the CIS can be made to act in vvays that are materially benefıcial and consonant vvith independent statehood vary from case to case.
4-The CIS vs. the EU: Consensualism vs. Supranationalism
Having seen that the CIS is clearly different from other organisations, one organisation remains for comparison: the EU. 48 Making such a comparison is important because the CIS Charter appears to have been envisioned to be something akin to the 1957 Treaty of Rome or even the 1992 Maastricht Treaty, as it vvas to create supranational bodies and authorize them to oversee integration on a variety of questions. 49 Hovvever, the CIS is so much different from the EU. The crux of difference lies in the fact that vvhereas the CIS is a remarkable example of intergovernmentalism and consensualism, the EU is par excellence of a supranational system. This is vvhere the CIS history is crammed vvith unsuccessful attempts to create a meaningful integration similar to its contemporaneous. In economic terms, as the future of the CIS vvas seen by "confederalists" as of another European Community, it vvas thought that economic integration vvould become the essential cohesion agent keeping the republics together. 50 Hovvever, the EU's institutional structure is an antipode of the CIS model.
As the former satellites vvere scared of the notorious experience of the Soviet Union's central authorities, they vvere quite afraid of creating a povverful institution vvhich could threaten their fledgling sovereignty. Due to political and historical reasons, the CIS countries vvere not ready to make a substantial transfer of their sovereignty to supranational institutions. In the end, the result vvas not surprising: Each member state vvas going to determine unilaterally its commitment. Each member vvould choose the level of commitment that best fıts its national interests. Member states possess unilateral discretion in determining both their level of involvement in a given issue area and the degree to vvhich they commit to negotiated multilateral policy outcomes. Areas of negotiation and potential joint activity span economic (including institutional/structural matters) and social (e.g., public health and the environment) areas, communications and transportation systems, and foreign and security issues. 51 To this end, the decision-making system was so loosely drafted that no member state vvhich is either disinterested in the issue, or does not want to participate in a given regulation, could be forced by the other member states to comply vvith a Council's decision. Should a member state be interested in the matter, it is entitled to veto an unacceptable decision. Should a member state declare that it has no interest in the question under consideration, this does not block the decision to be adopted at large. But the non-interested member state is left on its ovvn. To recapitulate differently, the crux of consensualism is that the abstentions of one or a fevv member states do not void the decision at large. For example, the CIS Charter vvas adopted by seven of the ten participating States. 52 Hovvever, the consensual rule can hardly vvork provided a decision be taken against a member state in the cases of dispute settlement or the use of sanctions.
What came out at the end of the day is that despite the fact that more than 200 arrangements on economic, military, ecological, social and other matters vvere concluded, their quantity does not commensurate vvith the expected quality. A plethora of decisions reached vvithin the CIS did not have teeth strong enough because of increasing disagreements among the members, vvhich in turn fostered mutual distrust. After ali, this nurtured bilateralism: Member states, predominantly Ukraine, evidently opted for bilateral treaties, vvhile others favoured the establishment of more compact sub-regional unions, such as the Central Asian common market vvhich vvas established in early January 1993. 53 Other 51 WiIIerton, Symposium: European Security. .g by 1994, the CIS adopted 270 documents, of vvhich one member had ratified only 40, another 140, and yet another 150. By early 1995, the number of unratified documents had come to about 400. 53 The main example of attempted sub-regional integration outside the framevvork of the CIS is the Central Asian Economic Community (CAEC-prior to July 1998 knovvn as the Central Asian Union), established in December 1994, and comprising Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and later Tajikistan (vvhich vvas granted entry in March 1998 Another example of the intergovernmentalism is that states are allowed to make reservations and explanatory declarations on the Charter articles relating to such organs as the Council of Commanders of Border Troops, the Economic Court, the Coordinating-Consultative Committee, the Council of Ministers of Defence and the High Command of the United Armed Forces, the Commission on Human Rights and the Inter-Parliamentary Assembly.
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As the Charter is a non-binding instrument, states are free to dissent from consensus positions, in effect protecting their national sovereignty while minimizing any loss of long-term manoeuvrability. Some states consistently minimized their commitment to CİS-sponsored economic and security agreements Councils of heads of state, of prime ministers and foreign ministers, ali of vvhich have held regular meetings. It has made some headvvay on the joint management of scarce vvater resources and has undertaken move tovvard joint investment projects and a regional customs union. Tentative steps have also been taken regarding military cooperation. 54 Payments Unions is a good illustration of this: In 1993, failure to establish a payments union and coordinate currency emissions led to the collapse of the 'ruble zone'. Türkmenistan and Azerbaijan refused to participate in the payments union. On the other hand, Ukraine used to participate only after the introduction of its national currency and indicated that it intended to retain full national control över its monetary policy. Apart from Uzbekistan, the rest of the member states put forvvard amendments or appended reservations that significantly diluted the Interstate Economic Committee's povvers. Pioneered by Ukraine, some states articulated specifically that IEC decisions could not supersede national legislation. see Olcott, Sovereignty and the Near Abroad.
(e.g., Ukraine and Moldova), vvhile others exhibited involvement in most, if not ali, multilateral arrangements (e.g., Armenia and Kazakhstan). They simultaneously manoeuvred to limit the development of any supra-state structures that might have oversight functions. 55 At the beginning there vvas a reaction tovvards erosion of sovereignty. As one Ukrainian offıcial stated at the time, "We don't vvant to have any suprastate structures playing the role of a 'drill sergeant' vvho vvould give orders to the Commonvvealth countries.". 56 Therefore the CIS Charter vvas so loose that it did not oblige members to do anything. 57 It appears that vvhat vvas in the minds of the founders of the CIS vvas not EU-like institution but vvas something like EFTA, a truly intergovernmental model.
On the other part of the spectrum, had the founders of the CIS managed to devise a supranational decision-making process, today the CIS vvould have been rather successful. This facet of supranationality, called as decisional (political/institutional) supranationalism, means that the member states abstain from vetoing proposals and try to achieve agreement by vvay of dovvngrading their national interests. 58 In this case, the CIS vvould have been strong enough to dictate its vvill to the states that brought it into existence, vvithout their consent. At this juneture, there is a clear distinetion betvveen a confederation, vvhere limited sovereignty is delegated, and supranationalism, vvhere sovereignty no longer exists. In this sense, the CIS or United Nations is similar to a confederation. It has left sovereignty intact, but has also added to international lavv. It govems by consent of the member states.
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The CIS founders should not take refuge in the excuse that nothing better could have been devised in the light of the then existing circumstances. When looked at the European experience, it is seen that at the beginning of the EEC, the European states vvere not unified and did not vvant to give ali povvers to supranational 55 Until the 1986 Single European Act, this vvas the case. In this period, there vvas a gradual diminution in the decision making process. This vvas partly because, according to the Accords, the member states might insist on unanimous decision, vvhere vital national interests vvere at risk. Although the Accords did not have the force of lavv, in many cases the Council accepted it as a Community norm. In this period, there vvere also other reasons for decline in the decision-making procedure: The independence and autonomous policy and decision-making role of the intergovernmental institutions and the vveight of nonintergovernmental institutions in pluri-institutional decisionmaking process vvere declining and in the execution or detailed legislative implementation of Community policies, there had been a shift to member state domination.
After the 1986 Single European Act (SEA), an impressive revival of a strong decisional supranationalism has seen, vvhich vvas nearly forgotten after the 1966 Accord. The most meaningful originality of the SEA vvas that it enlarged the sphere of areas in vvhich the majority of legislation being essential to complete the internal market, are to be enacted by qualified majority. There vvere also some institutional novelties strengthening decisional supranationalism: the Parliament, for example, increased its influence in the decision-making process as vvell as its role concerning the Community budget; the members of the 60 Commission vvere chosen among independent figures and the Commission's recommendations, after the SEA could hardly be amended by the Council. Before the SEA, the guardian of the Treaties vvas the Court, but the Act entitled the Commission to act as a "vvatch-dog" of the Community. In the end, vvhat the SEA has achieved vvas no more than a structural "perestroika" in institutional and political framevvorks of the Community. The tendency tovvards ever closer union vvent on to enact the 1992 Treaty on European Union (TEU), 1997 Amsterdam Treaty and 2000 Nice Treaty. Hovvever, one must admit that certain policy areas vvere taken out of the hands of the EC institutions altogether. This illustrates the continuing ambivalence of the direction of European integration.
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As can be seen decisional supranationalism vvas not easily achieved. It vvas a gradual and decisive struggle achieved över the years. The most important mistake of the CIS integration vvas that its organs vvere not vested in supranational povvers vvhile they vvere required to function as if they have been granted such suprapovvers, as the CIS's appearance on paper is rather similar to the EU.
The leaders ignored the fact that EU's success lies in its gradual evolution, during vvhich member states vvere forced to relinquish their sovereignty to Community organs. Hence, the fırst lesson to be learnt from the European integration is that its evolution vvas systematic and gradual. Core issues vvere tackled at fırst, and later, subtle issues vvere taken on board. For example, the Maastricht Treaty vvas the third attempt to create a monetary and economic union in Western Europe -after the Werner Plan, vvhich failed in the early 1970s.
Another example is that the TEU originates from the need for gradual evolution from a customs union to a common market and then to an economic and monetary union. The Treaty's logical scheme of gradual construction vvas not observed. The leaders could not make out that one cannot talk about common currency if there is not even a real customs union. Therefore, attempts at reforming the "ruble zone" in the absence of the necessary preceding stage of integration led this "zone" to ultimate failure.
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In the mid-1980s, when the European Economic Community was also called the "Common Market", no common market as such existed in practice. There was a customs union, but there vvere stili customs inspections at borders; there was free movement of citizens in the region, but there were stili passport checks, and so forth. Member states therefore sustained serious economic losses. After studying the problem, EU representatives compiled a list of essentially 300 legislative acts that had to be passed to eliminate "physical, technical, and tax barriers" to the movement of goods, services, capital, and citizens. This vvas the essence of the program for creating the common market. 63 Consequently, one of the most important lessons of the European experience (British and Italian leave of the EMS system) vvas the importance of consensus and compromise, in keeping vvith the fundamental principle that no one country can be forcibly dravvn into integration mechanisms, just as no one country is entitled to block the movement of other.
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If the projected Euroasian Economic Union is desired to be successful, and the CIS is vvanted to be transformed from its present commonvvealth structure into a confederation of states, in no vvay is there any alternative other than the member states surrendering large parts of their sovereignty to a supranational parliament charged vvith the development of a common economic policy, as vvell as common defence. 65 In other vvords, the universal peculiarities inherent in the integration process vvere not fully heeded. The CIS political analysts should elicit lessons from hovv the EC Commission and the EU Council are formed and hovv they vvere the vvatch-dog of EC interests and how purposefully moved ahead towards "ever closer union" despite conflict and crises.
The way the CIS was coneeived in the early 1990s has ignited widespread curiosity, amazement and debate över whether such a organisational cloning would succeed in giving birth to a viable and workable model for future integration efforts. A decade-lasting experience proved that cloning the EU model in the CIS body vvas unsuccessful. If the founders of the CIS do really vvant to rejuvenate it, they should yield to the fact that the EU is not a pertinent example to start vvith. Lukashenko's idea -to create povverful institutions to implement and enforce ali previous agreements and re-establish democratic centralism-is no better because it does not get round the question of sovereignty.
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Something more akin to the North American Free Trade Agreement might be plausible, but this vvould obviously limit the areas of CIS jurisdiction and not require political institutionalization. 67 At any rate, until there is a defınitive concept of vvhat is desirable and possible, the CIS vvill remain in its current state of limbo. Hovvever, it is unclear hovv much longer we vvill retain faith in its recoverability or reformability. In the 1950s, the member states of the EEC intended to create a court that could not signifıcantly compromise national sovereignty or national interest, but the ECJ changed the EU legal system, fundamentally undermining member state control över the Court. 69 It is thanks to the ECJ that the European integration managed to flourish in the course of time. use of law as a cohesion agent when it saw the political inertia which occurred in the early 1960s, shortly after "the euphoria of the fırst confıdent years after the Treaties of Rome" and after "the deadlock över de Gaulle's challenge to the Commission's supranational presentations and Community method".
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The diminution in the decision-making process and the impossibility of getting closer by means of political integration led to the emergence of the Court's activism knovvn as normative supranationalism. Starting from the mid-1960s, a growing gap between the reality of economic integration and the conceptual and political framevvork bore the principals of direct effect, supremacy and preemption as adhesive elements to fiil this grovving gap in the political framevvork of the Community. Therefore, through direct effect of the EC lavv and supremacy of the Community lavv principles, the Court acted as a partial agent and an advocate of the EC.
What makes the European Community a supranational organisation is not only hovv the Community decisions are prepared, discussed and fınally accepted, but hovv the Community policies and Community lavv are implemented. Legally speaking, the Community norms take effective precedence över national ones. In this hierarchy Community legislation is both directly applicable in the member states and is of supremacy över national lavvs.
When it comes to the CIS Court, one should subscribe to the fact that such a legal povver is given to the CIS Economic Court. the rules and norms of international law and the present Treaty shall be applied". 71 This implies that there are some supranational elements in it. Hovvever there is not an effective mechanism to make this provision true. It is not clear from the CIS Charter if resort to the Economic Court in the event of an economic dispute is mandatory or depends on the discretion of the disputing parties. In the latter case, vvhich is more likely, it will have to be specified vvhether a litigation in the Court can be initiated by a unilateral request of any of the disputants or only by their mutual consent. Finally, it is not clear what legal entities can be considered as "disputing parties"; only the member states or also their nationals directly involved in economic interactions. 72 Therefore, the CIS rcmains "a fairly loose organisation of states" as a result of the decision of the member states to adopt the model of multi-speed and multi-option integration. 73 Therefore member states are free to choose the level and pace of integration into the existing CIS structures. Since there is no institution like the ECJ vvhich developed the direct effect and supremacy principles through case-lavv, there vvas no way to advance the CIS ideals in cases vvhen the member states failed to adhere treaty provisions. That is to say, in addition to the vveakness of decision-making organs (Councils of Heads of State and Government) in cases vvhen CIS members simply ignored treaty provisions and did not accept necessary changes to be made for an ever closer CIS, the CIS structure lacked also a fully integrated judicial organ capable of settling disputes among the members. One should not be misled by the existence of the Economic Court either, in that as far as the 1992 Statute of the Economic Court is concerned, the Court is not an integral part of the CIS Charter. The CIS members are not ipso facto parties to the Statue of the Economic Court. jealousy of sovereignty lead one to believe that the CIS will never slumber. 77 As an organisation, its powers, competence, aims are not clear enough. This is not because these have not been dealt vvith in constituting documents of the CIS; but because its legal definition has not been articulated by the fathers of the organisation. To put it clearly, no one, arguably, could give a satisfactorily ansvver as to vvhether the CIS is an organisation similar or akin to the Commonvvealth, or the International Organisation of La Francophonie, the EU, or the Council of Europe.
2) Voluntary participation to the CIS bodies. For example, Ukraine, Türkmenistan and Uzbekistan did not participate in the CIS' Interparliamentary Assembly. Azerbaijan, Türkmenistan and Ukraine did not become a party to the dispute settlement system through the Economic Court; and these states together vvith Moldova have kept themselves aloof from CIS military bodies. Taking CIS structures as a vvhole, the greatest non-participation has occurred among Türkmenistan (in 31 bodies), Georgia (28), Azerbaijan (22), Ukraine (16), Moldova (12) and Uzbekistan (8). This voluntary participation system applies also to treaty-making process: Out of the 886 documents adopted by the CHS and CHG by March 1998, only 130 had been signed by ali 12 member states.
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3) Third layer of problems relates to decision making and implementation. At the apex of the CIS (the CHS and the CHG) decisions are taken, according to CIS documentation, by consensus. It is important to bear in mind that regional cooperation and far-fetched integration process necessitates dynamic and lengthy intergovernmental policy struggles, often complex consensus-building formulas, and piecemeal policy implementation. 4) The weakness of certain CIS organs such as the Inter-State Bank and the Economic Court resulted in the low levels of functional cooperation. As no CIS institution vvas devolved upon by the CIS Charter such a power to counteract in cases of national breaches, its most basic ideals, such as respecting state sovereignty, renouncing force or coercion to resolve conflicts, and integrating and coordinating economic programs, have consistently been breached more than practiced. 80 5) Attempts to emulate the European Community should have taken into fact that success also lies in that countries vvhich are economic, political and technological counterparts, vvhereas the countries that are party to the nevvly-formed Eurasian Economic Community are in no position to boast of their economic development. In such a situation, there can be no talk of equal cooperation betvveen its members. Bringing vvell-off countries closer together is a completely different thing from a union of poor countries that can hardly manage by themselves. 81 Hence, the fate of the CIS is contingent upon vvhether the development of the necessary preconditions for EC-like model vvill be made vvithout fail.
At the end of the day vvhat can be said is that having member states seemed to believe that obstacles to developing the CIS could not be easily surmounted, 82 they seek novv other realistic alternative small organisational models vvithin vvhich they could maximize their political and economic ends. Hence, some CIS countries set up separate organizations such as unions of five (GUUAM) or the EEC instead of realizing the CIS potential to the full and using its opportunities for economic cooperation. 83 Under these circumstances, the future of the CIS is very gloomy. These sub-regional bodies have accelerated the territorial fragmentation 80 of the CIS area and cannot but undermine any broadly based approach to developing some sort of supra-national Commonvvealth community. Member states are likely to confıne the CIS to the common lovvest denominators and vvould not support any measures that vvould grant it supranational povvers. 84 The ansvver of vvhether the Eurasian Economic Community is "nothing but a pipe dream", 85 or vvill likely to expand the cooperation of the participating countries and take the vvorthy place among other regional economic organisations, rests on hovv vvell a decade-long interaction of politics, lavv and economics are to be intermingled. As long as the nevv EEC takes into account the European dynamics rather than that of the Soviet, it is likely that it vvill flourish in the future. Othervvise, it could be look upon as another unsuccessful attempt at regional cooperation.
